ABSTRACT Searchable Encryption (SE) has been extensively examined by both academic and industry researchers. While many academic SE schemes show provable security, they usually expose some query information (e.g., search and access patterns) to achieve high efficiency. However, several inference attacks have exploited such leakage, e.g., a query recovery attack can convert opaque query trapdoors to their corresponding keywords based on some prior knowledge. On the other hand, many proposed SE schemes require significant modification of existing applications, which makes them less practical, weak in usability, and difficult to deploy. In this paper, we introduce a secure and practical searchable symmetric encryption scheme with provable security strength for cloud applications, called IDCrypt, which improves the search efficiency, and enhances the security strength of SE using symmetric cryptography. We further point out the main challenges in securely searching on multiple indexes and sharing encrypted data between multiple users. To address the above issues, we propose a token-adjustment search scheme to preserve the search functionality among multi-indexes, and a key sharing scheme which combines identity-based encryption and public-key encryption. Our experimental results show that the overhead of the key sharing scheme is fairly low.
I. INTRODUCTION
According to Cloud Security Alliance (CSA) report [1] , data breach is one of the top threats in cloud computing. In the first half of 2016, there were 974 publicly disclosed data breaches, which led to the loss of 554 million data records [2] . A promising solution to this issue is to encrypt sensitive data before outsourcing to a cloud service.
However, the encryption that protects user data hinders the search functionality of cloud applications. To address this issue, many Searchable Encryption (SE) schemes have been proposed, which usually consist of the following steps: A user generates its encrypted documents and a searchable encrypted index. The encrypted documents and the encrypted index are then outsourced to the cloud. To search a keyword, the user generates a so-called trapdoor. With the trapdoor, the cloud can search on the encrypted index and return related documents. With such steps, many proposed SE schemes require significant modifications of existing application and query interface customization, which makes them difficult to deploy in practice.
SE constructions usually try to exploit the trade-offs among functionality, security, and efficiency [3] . Song et al. [4] proposed the first practical SE construction. However, it shows a low efficiency and does not introduce a formal definition of SE security. Goh [5] proposed a secure index scheme that guaranteed the index security but not trapdoors; its search time is linear with the number of documents. Curtmola et al. [6] proposed the first sub-linear scheme which is more suitable for a static document set than a dynamic one. They introduced two new SE security definitions requiring that nothing should be leaked from the search process beyond the search and access patterns, which are widely used in current SE schemes [3] . As far as we know, most practical SE schemes expose the query access patterns. While the Oblivious RAM (ORAM) [7] can be used to support SE functions without leaking any information, it is not efficient for large-scale practical use.
In recent years, several inference attacks have been designed to exploit access pattern disclosures with prior knowledge. Islam et al. [8] proposed the first inference attack against SE schemes based on the leakage of access patterns. Cash et al. [9] exploited the leakage profiles of various SE schemes to infer sensitive information about queries and documents. However, these attacks require knowing almost all the documents as prior knowledge to achieve a high recovery rate of queries.
In this paper, we propose a secure and practical Searchable Symmetric Encryption (SSE) scheme called IDCrypt for protecting sensitive information in the cloud. In the IDCrypt architecture, we deploy an IDCrypt server that can be configured using off-the-shelf index-based search engines [10] , [11] to provide search functions on encrypted documents, which improves search efficiency and security strength of SE. IDCrypt achieves provable security and can mitigate the above inference attacks effectively. We further point out the main challenges in securely searching different indexes and sharing encrypted data among multi-users, summarized as follows:
• Searching encrypted data across different indexes.
A scenario is that user u 1 (who always uses secure search function on index I 1 encrypted by key k 1 ) wants to search the encrypted data on I 1 and another index I 2 that is encrypted by another key k 2 .
• Encrypted data sharing between multi-users. A typical scenario is that user u 1 wants to send an encrypted message to user u 2 . How to securely share encrypted data and keys among different users is another different challenge. To address above challenges, a token-adjustment search scheme is proposed in this paper to preserve the search functionality when a user searching on different indexes encrypted with different keys. Moreover, we design a TwoLayer Encryption Scheme (TLES), which combines IdentityBased Encryption (IBE) and Public-Key Encryption (PKE), to securely share secret keys between different users. We have evaluated the proposed schemes, and our experimental results show that the extra overhead of TLES is fairly low.
In summary, the main contributions of this paper are: 1) We proposed a practical SSE scheme with provable security strength, called IDCrypt, to improve the search efficiency and enhance the security of SE. It achieves provable security and can effectively mitigate the inference attacks on SE. The SSE schemes on IDCrypt are compatible with off-the-shelf index-based search engines, which can be easily deployed in practice. 2) We propose a token-adjustment search scheme to preserve the search functionality when a user needs to search different indexes encrypted by different keys.
3) We design a Two-Layer Encryption Scheme (TLES), which combines Identity-Based Encryption (IBE) and Public-Key Encryption (PKE), in order to share secret keys between different users securely and efficiently. The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the security definitions of SE and inference attacks on SE schemes. In Section 3, we introduce our IDCrypt architecture and depict its security analysis in detail. We present the token-adjustment search scheme in Section 4, and develop the TLES scheme in Section 5. We show the implementation of IDCrypt and evaluate its performance in Section 6. Related works are summarized in Section 7. We further conclude this paper and discuss our future work in Section 8.
II. BACKGROUND
In this section, we present the background information of the security definitions of SE and inference attacks on SE schemes.
A. TERMINOLOGY & PRELIMINARY
We
represents an ordered list consisting of the identifiers of all documents in D that contain the keyword w. Let |D(w)| be the number of documents in D(w). Let W = {w 1 , w 2 , . . . , w m } be the set of keywords in a dictionary W .
We refer to {0, 1} * as the set of all finite strings. Let {0, 1} s (s > 0) be the set of all the s-bit strings. We denote x R ← − X as an element x being sampled from a distribution X and x R ← − S as an element x being sampled uniformly from a set S. We write the output x of an algorithm A as x ← A. We let Z q denote the group {0, 1, . . . , q − 1} under addition modulo q. Let the set Z * q = Z q \{O} where O is the identity element in the group Z q . Given a function f , we call f (s) negligible if for every polynomial p(·) and all sufficiently large s, f (s) < 
with s, n, m > 0 is computable in polynomial time and for all probabilistic polynomial-time adversaries A, all polynomials p and sufficiently large s:
2) SECURITY OF SYMMETRIC ENCRYPTION
A symmetric encryption scheme E = (K , E , D) is secure against chosen-ciphertext attacks if for all probabilistic VOLUME 6, 2018 polynomial-time adversaries A, all polynomials p and sufficiently large s:
with the restrictions that |m 0 | = |m 1 |, and A cannot query D with c.
B. SEARCHABLE SYMMETRIC ENCRYPTION
A Searchable Symmetric Encryption (SSE) scheme is a collection of four polynomial-time algorithms as follows:
Keygen(1 s ): a probabilistic key generation algorithm that takes a security parameter s, and outputs a secret key k. It is run by the user to setup the scheme.
BuildIndex(k, D): a (possibly probabilistic) algorithm takes a secret key k and a document collection D as inputs, and outputs an index I .
Trapdoor(k, w): an algorithm that takes a secret key k and a keyword w as inputs, and outputs a trapdoor T w . It is run by the user to perform a search operation.
Search(I , T w ): an algorithm that takes an index I and a trapdoor T w for keyword w as inputs, and returns a search result D(w).
We refer to a sequence of query results (D(w 1 ), . . . , D(w i )) of a sequence of query keywords (w 1 , . . . , w i ) as an access pattern. The search pattern means the information that can be derived in the following manner: given two arbitrary queries, knowing whether the two searches use the same keyword or not. Referring to [6] and [12] , the security definitions of common SSE schemes follow the real/ideal simulation paradigm. They leak certain information to achieve better performance and we quantify the leakage profile by a leakage function L. The SSE scheme is said to be L − secure if there exists a simulator S, which takes an input L(P) with P a history of the protocol and outputs a view S(L(P)) that is indistinguishable from the view of an adversary in a real execution of the protocol with input P. 
We define (L 1 , L 2 ) semantically secure against non-adaptive attacks in the same way, except that A must choose all of its queries at the start in both games. It can only provide security if the client's queries are independent of the search index and of previous query results.
Common SSE models can be classified into tokenbased SE and index-based SE. Token-based SE scheme can search users' encrypted sensitive data without modifying cloud Application Programming Interface (API). As shown in Fig.1 , a token-based SE scheme is depicted as follows. 1) A user extracts keywords from a document D i , generates a token for each keyword by deterministically encrypted the keyword using a pseudo-random function f (such as HMAC) and a secret key k, and encrypts document D i using a secret key K . Then the user appends the sorted tokens to the ciphertext, and uploads them to the cloud. 2) When searching for a keyword w, the broker applies the keyword to the pseudo-random function f and sends generated token TK = f k (w) to the server. 3) The server can search for the token TK using the original search algorithms and return the corresponding encrypted data or document identifiers.
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With the above discussion, we can conclude that besides the sizes of the documents and tokens, the L 1 leakage in the token-based SSE model exposed the information of the number of keywords in a document, the document similarity, the keyword occurrence pattern and the keyword co-occurrence pattern. The L 2 leakage exposed the search pattern and the access pattern, which can be inferred from the L 1 leakage.
An index-based SE scheme delegates search capabilities to a cloud provider on behalf of a user, which should modify cloud API to invoke specific SE libraries. Curtmola et al. [6] first proposed an index-based SSE scheme that lets nothing but the search and access patterns be known to the server. As shown in Fig. 1 , it built a posting list consisting of |D(w)| nodes for each keyword w. A posting contains an identifier of a document containing w, a key used to decrypt the next encrypted posting, and a pointer to the next encrypted posting. All postings are encrypted with random keys and scrambled in a random order.
Based on the security definitions of the symmetric encryption E and the pseudo-random function f , we conclude that the L 1 leakage in the index-based SSE model exposed nothing besides the sizes of the documents and indexes. However, the L 2 leakage exposed the information of search patterns and access patterns. From this leakage, we can infer keyword occurrence patterns and keyword co-occurrence patterns for queried keywords.
C. INFERENCE ATTACKS
Inference attacks on SE schemes often use the information of keyword occurrence frequency and multi-keyword co-occurrence frequency to guess the query keywords or document contents. They usually contain the following steps.
1) An adversary used the leaked information of the SE scheme (e.g., search patterns and access patterns) to infer the frequency of the query keyword or co-occurrence frequency of multiple query keywords. 2) With prior knowledge of the documents, the adversary can count the frequency of plaintext keyword and the co-occurrence frequency of multi-keywords respectively. 3) With the plaintext statistics and the query information, the adversary designed matching algorithms to infer the query keywords. Islam et al. [8] first initiated the inference attacks on SE with the help of access pattern disclosure. They use simulated annealing [13] to find the optimal mapping between query trapdoors and keywords. Cash et al. [9] proposed a simple and efficient attack algorithm to address the same issue as IKK. Shadow Nemesis [14] launched inference attacks on the token-based SE schemes using the Weighted Graph Matching (WGM) problem. However, to invert an encrypted keyword with a high accuracy, an adversary must have sufficient knowledge of the documents in the above attacks.
III. IDCRYPT ARCHITECTURE
We first provide a high-level system overview of our IDCrypt architecture in the following, and then propose two easilydeployable SSE schemes that improve the efficiency and security of SE with provable security definitions.
A. SYSTEM OVERVIEW IDCrypt encrypts the confidential data of a user using a proxy before outsourcing it to cloud servers. To support encrypted search functions, the proxy of IDCrypt on the client side indexes a document with the document identifier that points to the encrypted data in the cloud, and relies on an IDCrypt server to assist in managing and searching on the index, thus taking the management burden off the proxy of IDCrypt. In particular, the IDCrypt paradigm focuses on usability and does not need to modify the cloud interfaces and a user's familiar usage patterns. As shown in Fig. 2 , IDCrypt consists of the following main components: -Proxy: A proxy is responsible for encrypting a user's confidential data. It is also responsible for generating the searchable encrypted index for a document set. -IDCrypt server: An IDCrypt server is responsible for managing the index and executing search operations. IDCrypt assumes that the processing in a proxy is trustworthy and secure, namely the data within the proxy is transmitted in clear texts. Besides, since IDCrypt indexes the plaintext data inside the proxy with identifiers pointing to encrypted data at cloud servers, it has to protect the proxy from external accesses and attacks.
The pathways outside a user's proxy, including the cloud servers and the IDCrypt server are considered untrusted. As shown in Fig. 2 , the sensitive data is encrypted by the proxy before passed to the outside, thus effectively preventing the cloud servers and the IDCrypt server from stealing private information. In addition, even if the cloud servers and the IDCrypt server collude, they cannot recover the plaintexts because they cannot get the corresponding keys that are located in the user's proxy. Outside the proxy, even if the user's account is stolen by an attacker, the attacker can only access encrypted data, thus IDCrypt can effectively protect the confidential data of users in cloud applications. 
B. SSE-I SCHEME
To construct an efficient inverted index over the keywords in a document set, IDCrypt locates the IDCrypt server at the cloud server side. IDCrypt encrypts the searchable index to prevent the cloud server's snooping, and protect privacy information (e.g., searchable keywords and document identifiers), as shown in Algorithm 1. The procedures of the SSE-I scheme are as follows.
Algorithm 1 SSE-I Algorithms
Given a security parameter s, output keys K, K', k. 
PL(t) according to H(t), add E K (ID(D i )) to PL(t);
13 else 14 add t to W t ;
initialize a posting list PL(t) according to H(t), add E K (ID(D i )) to PL(t).

16
output index I = (W t , PL).
Algorithm Trapdoor (w)
18
Output TK w = f k (w).
Algorithm Search (I, TK w )
20
Search TK w in the index I ;
21
Output the corresponding encrypted IDs.
1)
For each document in a document set, the proxy first extracts keywords from the document, and generates searchable tokens by deterministically encrypting the extracted keywords.
2) Then, the proxy gets the document identifiers that point to the encrypted documents in the cloud. It maps the tokens of a document with corresponding document identifier respectively.
3) Finally, the proxy indexes the searchable tokens with their encrypted document identifiers, and uploads the encrypted index to the IDCrypt server.
4) When a user performs a search operation for a keyword, the proxy sends the corresponding token of the keyword to the IDCrypt server; the IDCrypt server performs the search operation and returns the encrypted document identifiers. 5) After decrypted by the proxy, the document identifiers can be used to request the encrypted documents from the cloud servers. The user sends the cloud server retrieve requests to get the relevant documents. In this way the requests could be embedded in other retrievals so that the cloud server might have uncertainty about the correlation of the search request and the retrieval request for ciphertext.
The index structure of the SSE-I scheme is shown in Fig. 3 . For each keyword w ∈ W , a linked posting list PL(t) with length |D(w)| is built, in which t is the corresponding token of keyword w. Each item of PL(t) consists of an encrypted document identifier ID(D i ) of D i that contains the keyword w. The entries of a look-up table W t are tuples <value, address>, in which the value field is used to locate the corresponding posting list by a pseudo-random function H . That is, when a keyword is queried, we use its corresponding token value to locate its posting list.
When a user initiates a query request, the proxy analyzes the request to get the query keyword. The proxy then generates the corresponding token of the keyword and sends a request with the token to the IDCrypt server. With the token, the IDCrypt server searches on the index and returns the list of corresponding encrypted document identifiers. However, if the proxy sends all the document identifiers orderly to cloud servers to retrieve those documents in the following requests, the could servers may still observe the access patterns. Fortunately, in many cloud applications, the user tends to retrieve only part of the search results. After decrypting the encrypted document identifiers, the requests for some selected document identifiers could be embedded in other retrievals for irrelevant documents to disturb the access patterns. When receiving the data, the proxy filters and decrypts relevant documents and returns the plaintext data to the end user. Since document identifiers are encrypted, an adversary can not deduce the keyword co-occurrence frequency from the query results. In this way, the SSE-I scheme hides the access pattern to a certain extent. However, it leaks the number of documents in which a keyword appears. We emphasize that the sizes of documents and the index will also be leaked, which is common and not mentioned in our security definations.
Theorem 1: The SSE-I scheme is adaptively (L 1 , L 2 ) secure, in which the L 1 leakage exposed the number of searchable tokens, the occurrence count of each keyword (the number of encrypted document identifiers of each token). The L 2 leakage exposed search patterns, and the occurrence counts of query keywords from access patterns, which can be deduced from the L 1 leakage.
Proof: For the proof, we follow the security definitions of SSE [6] , [12] . We say our SSE-I scheme is (L 1 , L 2 ) semantically secure against adaptive attacks if, for all (non-uniform) PPT adversaries A, all polynomials p and sufficiently large s, there exists a (non-uniform) PPT simulator S that can simulate the encrypted index I and ciphertexts E K (D) with a probability negligibly close to 1.
At a high level, the PPT simulator S builds a simulated encrypted index I * and a simulated sequence of ciphertexts E * K (D) using the information that it receives from L 1 leakage, which includes the number of searchable tokens, and the occurrence count of each keyword. Then, the ideal index I * can be constructed similarly to a real index, the output tokens of the pseudo-random function are replaced by random values, and the encrypted documents are replaced by random strings.
-Generating posting lists PL * : For each keyword w and |D(w)|, S generates |D(w)| encrypted document identifiers and sets them as a posting list for w. -Generating look-up table W * t : For each keyword w, S generates a random string t and lets H (t) point to the posting list of w. S records the correspondence between w and t.
-Generating query trapdoor TK * : For the query keyword w, S sets its trapdoor TK * w as t corresponds to the keyword w.
-Simulating E * K (D) in the same manner (i.e., replacing ciphertexts by random strings) and the security of the symmetric encryption guarantees indistinguishability. The security of the symmetric encryption and the pseudorandom function guarantees that the simulated ciphertexts E * K (D) are indistinguishable from the real encrypted documents, the resulting encrypted index I * = (W * t , PL * ) is indistinguishable from a real encrypted index, and the resulting trapdoor TK * is indistinguishable from a real trapdoor. This completes the proof of the theorem.
Based on inverted index [15] , our SSE-I scheme is very efficient, in which the time complexity of index building is O(N ), where N = w |D(w)|. The time complexity of searching is O (1) , and the index size is O(m + N ), where m is the total number of keywords. Besides, the scheme hides keyword co-occurrence patterns, as all document identifiers are encrypted to random values. However, the scheme exposed the number of documents in which a keyword appears, which may be exploited by an adversary to infer some queries if the adversary has sufficient knowledge of the documents. In the following, we design a scheme called SSE-II that can hide keyword occurrence frequencies.
C. SSE-II SCHEME
In the SSE-II scheme, we pad the length of the posting list of each keyword to a fixed number c. We can determine the number c according to the most frequent keyword in a document set. Before building the index for a document set, we need to count the occurrence number of the most frequent keyword. An alternative way is setting the number c as the total number of documents. This method is more efficient at the cost of more space. After determining the number c, for each keyword, if its occurrence number is less than c, we pad the length of its posting list to c with random strings.
Theorem 2: The SSE-II scheme is adaptively (L 1 , L 2 ) secure, where L 1 leakage exposes the number of searchable tokens, and L 2 leakage exposes the search pattern.
The proof of this theorem is similar to that of Theorem 1; except that in the process of generating posting lists, for each posting list of keyword w, the simulator S pads some random strings to set the length of the posting list as c.
In our SSE-II scheme the time complexity of index building is O(cm), the time complexity of searching is O (1) , and the index size is O(m + cm), where m is the total number of keywords. Besides, the scheme hides the number of documents in which a keyword appears and the keyword co-occurrence patterns, as all document identifiers are encrypted to random values and some random strings are padded to the index. So the SSE-II scheme can mitigate the inference attacks on SE even if an adversary has complete knowledge of the documents. Note that after receiving the search result of a keyword, the proxy should filter the padded random strings after decryption in the SSE-II scheme.
IV. ENCRYPTED SEARCH ON MULTIPLE INDEXES
In practice, a user may have different document sets in different cloud applications, so the indexes of different document sets may be encrypted using different keys. When a user wants to search for all document sets, he must generate multiple distinct search tokens for a keyword, and send all of them to the IDCrypt server. In another case, there may be multi-users in the same proxy. The documents of different users and their indexes are encrypted with different keys. Many efficient SSE schemes [4] - [6] assume that a key used to encrypt a search keyword is not publicly available, and they are suitable for a single-user scenario. If a user u 1 VOLUME 6, 2018 wants to delegate another user to search its documents for a keyword, one approach is that user u 1 sends the request instead of the other user, and then sends the result to the other user. However, when the same request is repeated many times by other users, this approach is inefficient for user u 1 . To address this issue, we design a token-adjustment search scheme, presented in the following.
A. TOKEN-ADJUSTMENT SEARCH SCHEME
In the token-adjustment search scheme, if a user wants to search for a keyword in a set of indexes, in which each index is encrypted with a different key, the user only needs to provide a single search token for that keyword to the IDCrypt server. The IDCrypt server, in turn, returns each encrypted identifier of a document that contains the keyword.
We assume user Alice's own key is k 1 , and the index I that Alice searches for is encrypted with key k 2 in a common proxy. Alice computes a search token for a keyword w using key k 1 , denoted t 1 . If the corresponding token of w of the index I in the IDCrypt server is t 2 instead of t 1 , the IDCrypt server must adjust the search token t 1 to t 2 .
The token-adjustment search scheme allows the IDCrypt server to perform the adjustment. In the first place, the index owner must provide a delta, which is a cryptographic value that enables the IDCrypt server to adjust a search token from one key to another key. We use t 1 →t 2 to denote the delta that allows the IDCrypt server to adjust t 1 to t 2 . Note that these deltas can be reused for subsequent search operations, so the index owner needs to generate the deltas only once.
B. CRYPTOGRAPHIC CONSTRUCTION
We construct the token adjustment search scheme based on the key derivation algorithm proposed by Atallah et al. [16] , in which a delta between two keys k i and k j is defined as follows:
where L j is a public label associated with k j , ⊕ is the XOR operator and f is a pseudo-random function. Referring to Equation 1, the token-adjustment search algorithm is depicted as follows: Given two tokens t i and t j that are encrypted by different keys for keyword w, a delta between t i and t j is defined as
where L w is a public label associated with the keyword w, and f is a pseudorandom function, which can be implemented using a cryptographic hash function such as HMAC.
The procedure of the token-adjustment search scheme is depicted as follows:
1) If Alice wants to search w on the index I built by Bob in a common proxy, she sends a request to Bob with the value f (t i , L w ), in which t i is the token of w computed by Alice.
2) On receiving the request, Bob checks whether Alice has the right to search for w. If passed, Bob computes the delta value t i →t j = t j ⊕ f (t i , L w ) with the corresponding token t j of w. Finally, it uploads the delta to the IDCrypt server.
3) In the subsequent searches, if Alice wants to search for the keyword w, she can send the value t i to the IDCrypt server. As the pseudorandom function f and keyword associated value L w are known to the IDCrypt server, then the IDCrypt server can adjust the value to t j by computing L w ) , thus the IDCrypt server can search the token t j on the index I built by Bob.
For a user, different keywords of his documents have different labels; for a common keyword, different users within a proxy have different tokens encrypted with different keys. In this way, a user can control which keyword of a document set can be searched by which user. So the token-adjustment search scheme can realize fine-grained access control.
V. ENCRYPTED DATA SHARING BETWEEN PROXIES
In the IDCrypt architecture, the data is encrypted at the proxy, namely the secret key is located in the proxy. So only the proxy can decrypt the data. A typical scenario is that user u 1 , on premise of proxy P 1 , wants to share a file with user u 2 , who is under another proxy P 2 . When user u 2 receives the encrypted file from the cloud, it is encrypted by proxy P 1 . So the problem is how to share encrypted data between different proxies.
To address the above issue, secret key sharing is an obvious solution. However, the secret key must be shared securely, and the receiver must provide a credential that is trusted by both parties. To do this, a PKE scheme needs a mechanism to authenticate the public key of a user. In PKE, a certificate is issued by a trusted certificate authority (CA). The certificate binds together several quantities including the name of a user, its public key PK , the issue date and the expiration date. In some cases (e.g., a user accidentally reveals its secret key), a certificate may be required to be revoked before its intended expiration date. Although the PKE scheme does not have private key escrow issue, but the public key certificates in PKE contain a preset expiration date. It is inefficient in the case of revoking lots of certificates or bringing many thirdparty queries for certificate status [17] .
Alternatively, an IBE scheme [18] can achieve implicit certification that allows us to eliminate third-party queries on certificate status. It allows any party to generate a public key according to pre-assigned parameters and a known identity ID (can be a string, e.g., an email address). The corresponding private key is generated by a third party called Private Key Generator (PKG). The PKG first publishes certain system parameters params, and keeps the corresponding master private key sk IBE hidden. Any party can compute the public key of an identity ID given the params, and only the party authorized to use the identity ID can obtain the corresponding private key d over a secure channel. The private key d is generated by the PKG using the params and the master private key sk IBE . A notable advantage of IBE scheme is that a sender can encrypt a plaintext message without the prior distribution and authentication of public keys, thus the sender does not need to communicate with any third party to obtain and authenticate the public key of a receiver. This is extremely useful in the circumstances where the distribution and authentication of public keys are inconvenient or infeasible. When the private key of an identity ID needs to be updated, we can concatenate the identity ID with a time parameter t as a new identity ID. This forces the user having the old private key to obtain a new private key for the new identity ID.
However, IBE has private key escrow problem, namely the PKG in IBE can decrypt the encrypted data of a user. We combine IBE and PKE to realize a Two-Layer Encryption Scheme (TLES), which adopts their unique advantages to address their deficiencies. Finally we design a practical prototype system and perform performance evaluations.
A control node is deployed as the PKG of the TLES scheme. When a proxy is initialized, the proxy authenticates to the control node using its own PKE public key and its identity ID. After authentication, the control node issues an IBE private key d corresponding to the identity ID. The control node is also responsible for initializing and updating the basic information of a proxy, such as proxy ID, proxy PKE public key PK , etc. A proxy can query some related attributions (e.g., proxy ID and proxy public key PK ) of another proxy from the control node.
When a data block is encrypted at a proxy, a metadata, including key ID, proxy ID, magic tag, header length, etc., is attached to the encrypted data. A magic tag is a symbol string used to identify the encrypted data, so the decryption process can find the ciphertext easily. The proxy records the key ID that marks the relationship between the encrypted data and its corresponding key. Let the identity ID of the proxy denote its IBE publics key, d denote the IBE private key, PK denote the PKE public key, and SK denote the PKE private key. As shown in Fig. 4 , the procedure of key sharing scheme between different proxies is presented as follows.
1-3) Proxy B receives the ciphertext encrypted by proxy A from the cloud. We use Bilinear maps to construct the TLES scheme. We give the definition of the Bilinear Map as follows.
Bilinear Map: Let G 1 and G 2 be two cyclic groups of order p for some large prime p. G 1 is the group of points of an elliptic curve over a finite field F q and G 2 is a subgroup of a finite field F * q 2 . A mapê : G 1 × G 1 → G 2 is said to be bilinear ifê(aP, bQ) =ê(P, Q) ab for all P, Q ∈ G 1 and all a, b ∈ Z .
Referring to [18] , our concrete TLES algorithm, based on the Bilinear Mapê :
is shown as follows
Setup: The control node generates the system parameters params = <q, n, P, P pub , G, H > and the master-key sk IBE . After setup, the control node exports params to a file and forwards it to proxies.
• Step 1: The pairings are constructed on the curve y 2 = x 3 + x over the field F q for a prime q = 3(mod4). We generate prime q by the formula q + 1 = t * h, in which t is a prime and h is a multiple of 12. For efficiency, t has the form 2 a − 2 b − 1 for integer a and b, 0 < b < a. For security strength, we set the length of t = 160 bits, the length of q = 512 bits. Let E be the elliptic curve defined by y 2 = x 3 + x over F q . Choose an arbitrary P ∈ E/F q . VOLUME 6, 2018
•
Step 2: Pick a random sk IBE ∈ Z * q and set P pub = sk IBE P.
• Step 3: Choose a cryptographic hash function H : F q 2 → {0, 1} n for n. Choose a cryptographic hash function G : {0, 1} * → F q . The security analysis will view H and G as random oracles. The message space is {0, 1} n . The ciphertext space is E/F q × {0, 1} n . Extract: For a given string ID ∈ {0, 1} * from the proxy identity and time parameters t, generate a private key d as follows.
• Step 1: Map ID and t to a point Q ID ∈ E/F q .
• Step 2: Set the private key d to be d = sk IBE Q ID , where sk IBE is the master key. The control node then encrypts the private key d using proxy's PKE public key and forwards it to the proxy. The proxy decrypts it to get the private key d.
Encrypt: Encrypt M ∈ {0, 1} n under the public key ID, time parameters t and public key PK B .
• Step 1: Map ID and t into a point Q ID .
• Step 2: choose a random r ∈ Z q .
• Step 3:
• Step 4: Encrypts rP with the proxy PKE public key PK B , set the ciphertext to be C = <E PK B (rP), M ⊕ H (g r ID )>. Decrypt: Decrypt M with the PKE private key SK B and the private key d.
>, Decrypts E PK B (rP) with the proxy PKE private key SK B , set U = D SK B (E PK B (rP)) = rP.
• Step 2: Let C 1 = <U , V >. Decrypt C 1 using the private key d : V ⊕ H (ê(d, U )) = M . As mentioned above, TLES effectively ensures the secure transmission of secret keys, and only the proxy that matches the identity ID can get the keys. With time parameter t, it can effectively update the IBE private key of the proxy to improve security. Even if the control node has the IBE private key d of a proxy, it cannot recover rP because it does not have the PKE private key SK of the proxy. To get M , H (g r ID ) must be obtained, since r is random, the control node cannot achieve its goal. If a malicious attacker steals the private key SK , thus it has the corresponding PKE private key, which can get rP , but it has not the IBE corresponding private key d, H (ê(d, U ) ) cannot be calculated, thus it cannot restore M . The security definitions of TLES scheme is shown in the Appendix. Our basic TLES scheme mentioned above is a oneway encryption secure scheme. It is a weak notion of security that an adversary may learn half the bits of the plaintext. However, the TLES scheme is suitable for encrypting secret keys in the random oracle model. Furthermore, according to [18] , we can use a scheme from Fujisaki and Okamoto [19] to convert it to be secure against adaptive chosen-ciphertext attack conveniently.
VI. EVALUATION
In this section we focus on three main questions. First, how much developer effort is required to construct the proposed SSE schemes. Second, whether the SSE schemes can mitigate the inference attacks in which an adversary has the complete knowledge of the documents. Third, what are the performance overheads of the TLES scheme in key sharing process between different proxies.
A. DEVELOPER EFFORT
For index construction, search and sharing scenarios, commonly used open source search engines such as Elastic Search [10] can be integrated into our system. We can manage the complexity of distributed systems well with the help of Elastic Search.
As shown in Fig 5, there exist multiple nodes in the IDCrypt system. IDCrypt builds the index in a node of a proxy, and balances the index data across the nodes of an IDCrypt server to spread the index data and search load. The IDCrypt server performs the search operation and returns the search results. It routes a search request from any proxy to the nodes that hold the index data, and returns the aggregated results to the proxy. Elastic Search provides a distributed system on top of Lucene [11] . We also build the index of a document set in a proxy with the help of Lucene. Fig. 6 shows a traditional process of index building, in which an original file is first processed to a document structure that contains multiple fields. The fields are parsed to create keyword-docID pairs. When the size of keyword-docID pairs is sufficient large, the keyword-docID pairs with the same keyword are collected respectively to build a postings list of the keyword, where a posting is simply a docID. A docID is an integer which can be used to find the corresponding document contents. However, in our SSE scheme, as the data is encrypted and stored in the cloud, we need to map the docID to the document identifier that points to the encrypted data in the cloud. We do not need to manage the content of the original file, such that we can build the index easily and flexibly. As mentioned earlier, we generate the corresponding tokens for extracted keywords and encrypt the docID to a random value when processing each document, and store the searchable tokens and encrypted docIDs in the index.
In order to save memory or disk space, these docIDs that we just discussed are best stored in integer form, such that they can be compressed efficiently in the index. For instance, the posting lists of an index containing the integral docIDs can be compressed with delta-encoding [15] . To save time and space, in our SSE schemes, when a document is processed, its document identifier can be mapped to an integer range according to the number of keywords in the document. When extracting a keyword from the document, we make the docID plus one instead of encrypting the docID, and then build the token-docID pair. In this way we can construct an index of a document set securely and efficiently, and compress the index using the off-the-shelf algorithms in Lucene project.
B. SECURITY EVALUATION ON OUR SSE SCHEMES
We empirically investigate the security of our SSE schemes by comparing them with Curtmola's construction. We use the count attack scheme [9] to infer the keywords of opaque query trapdoors, in which the adversary has the complete knowledge of all the documents. While it is unrealistic for an adversary to know all documents of a user in normal cases, this may happen sometimes. For example, a user has a set of emails stored at an email server, and it decides to encrypt all the emails using a SE scheme. We use the online-available Enron [20] email set as the dataset. We chose the emails of the ''_sent_mail'' folder of 78 employees, resulting in 30,109 messages. A message is considered as a document. We extract the keywords in each document using the standard Porter stemming algorithm [21] ; then remove stop-words [22] and duplicate keywords. There exist 49,982 unique keywords in the 30,109 documents. We then establish a fixed-size keyword universe by taking the most frequent 5000 keywords. Fig. 7 shows the query recovery results of the count attack against Curtmola's scheme and our schemes. We run attacks on each scheme in the same setup with the adversary having no access to any queries. For the fixed number of keyword universe, we vary the number of query keywords from 500 to 3000.
As the results show, an adversary can invert the most query trapdoors against Curtmola's construction, because it exposed search and access patterns. In this scheme, an adversary can deduce the keyword occurrence frequency and the keyword co-occurrence frequency over the keywords that have been queried. According to the count attack algorithm, for each search trapdoor, the adversary first counts the number of documents in its query result, and then tries to find a unique keyword appeared in the same number of plaintext documents. If the keyword is found, then it can be mapped to the trapdoor directly. We called this the first round attack. In the second round attack, the adversary uses the keyword co-occurrence frequency to deduce other mappings between keywords and trapdoors. Based on the alreadybuilt mappings, given an unknown trapdoor q, the adversary first selects the candidate keywords that appeared in the same number of plaintext documents as the length of query result of q. Then, to filter the candidate keyword set of q, for each pair of mapped keyword-trapdoor pair w and q , the adversary computes the count c 1 of plaintext documents in which the keyword w and w both appear, and the count c 2 of documents which both the query q and q hit in query results. If c 1 is not equal to c 2 , then the keyword w will be removed from the candidate keyword set. Finally, if only one keyword meeting all the conditions is left, then it can be mapped to q.
In our SSE-I scheme, an adversary can invert a quite small portion of queried trapdoors, as the scheme only leaks the keyword occurrence frequency information in the query results. The adversary can only perform the first round attack with such leakage. In particular, our SSE-II scheme leaks no information about the keyword occurrence frequency or the keyword co-occurrence frequency, thus the adversary can invert no search trapdoors. From Fig. 7 we can conclude that, when the size of the keyword vocabulary is fixed, even if only a few query trapdoors are inverted in the first round attack in Curtmola's scheme, then almost all trapdoors can be mapped to their plaintext keywords in the second round attack. However, in our SSE schemes, the number of identified trapdoors does not increase after the first round attack.
C. PERFORMANCE OVERHEADS OF TLES SCHEME
In this section we test the overheads of key sharing operations. The configurations of our test virtual machines are Intel 2.5 GHz dual-core with 4 GB of memory, the uplink speed is approximately 1 MB/s, and the downlink speed is approximately 7.5 MB/s.
In the scenario of key sharing, the control node is deployed on a separate virtual machine. The communications between a proxy and a control node is mainly implemented by socket transmission. We generate the 4096 bit PKE key pair with OpenSSL library [23] . We use elliptic curves to implement IBE, and invoke the PBC library [24] for bilinear pairings. In order to demonstrate the performance of the TLES scheme, we test each process of the TLES, including system parameter generation, private key issuing, key encryption and key decryption. The average time in each process is shown in Table 1 . We concluded from the results that the key decryption process takes more time than the key encryption process, but it is negligible and not noticeable by a user. Generally speaking, the extra overhead in milliseconds level introduced by TLES scheme is insignificant and acceptable for smooth user experience. 
VII. RELATED WORK A. TYPICAL SEARCHABLE ENCRYPTION SCHEMES
Song et al. [4] proposed the first practical SE scheme. Goh [5] proposed a secure index method to achieve SE using Bloom Filters. However, they are not sub-linear. Curtmola et al. [6] builds an encrypted search mechanism using inverted indexes, increased the search efficiency greatly, and improved the security of the encrypted search. It can only support exact keyword search and documents can not be updated dynamically. Based on this scheme, advanced SE functions are further developed, such as [12] , [25] , and [26] . For multi-user encrypted search, Boneh et al. [27] realized the Public Key Encryption with Keyword Search (PEKS) algorithm using asymmetric encryption. However, asymmetric SE schemes led to greater performance loss.
All searchable encryption schemes mentioned in the above require to modify the current cloud query interfaces. In addition, they leak search and access patterns for performance efficiency, which can be exploited by adversaries to get sensitive information [8] , [9] .
B. COMMON SEARCHABLE ENCRYPTION SYSTEMS
At protect-point A between a user and the client side in Fig. 2 , the SE functions of [28] and [29] are based on token-based SE scheme. An adversary can launch inference attacks on their SE schemes with prior knowledge using token occurrence patterns, as in [9] and [14] . Some commercial SE products from Skyhigh [30] , CipherCloud [31] , and Virtue [32] also use the token-based scheme or its variants to support SE functions in some cloud services. At protect-point B between the client side and the server side in Fig. 2 , Mylar used Song's SE scheme [4] to construct their SE functions, which can be attacked by recent works [34] , [35] using leaked information. At protect-point C between the server side and the database in Fig. 2 , CryptDB [36] encrypts the data before it is put into the database, and performs query requests on the encrypted data based on Song's SE scheme [4] , thus effectively preventing the malicious database administrator. However, CryptDB can not prevent the server program stealing information.
C. ENCRYPTED KEY SHARING SCHEMES
Commonly used mechanisms for sharing keys are PKE and IBE. Two of the most well-known PKE certificate verification schemes are Certificate Revocation List (CRL) and Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP). However, they are both inefficient in the case of revoking lots of certificates in realtime [17] . Micali proposed ''Novomodo'' system [37] achieving better efficiency, but it brings many third-party queries for certification status. To eliminate certificate status queries, IBE seems to be an effective way. Shamir [38] proposed the identity-based encryption and introduced an identitybased signature scheme. However, it is not practical for highvolume systems. Boneh and Franklin [18] proposed a fully functional scheme based on the Weil pairing. Nevertheless, IBE itself has a private key escrow problem: The private key generator can decrypt the ciphertext of a user. To address this, Certificate-Based Encryption [17] and Certificate-Less Public Key Cryptography [39] combine IBE and PKE to realize double encryption, but they do not perform detailed performance evaluations. Lewko and Waters [40] designed a scheme supporting multiple authorized parties. However, it has no practical evaluations. For sharing keys securely, we design a practical TLES scheme and perform performance evaluations.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we first conducted a systematic and quantitative comparison between index-based SE and token-based SE schemes. We describe the SSE schemes of our IDCrypt architecture in detail and analyze its security. To fulfill encrypted search, IDCrypt builds search indexes at proxies with the identifiers of encrypted data. We also design the token-adjustment search scheme to search across different indexes. To share encrypted data between different users, we propose the two-layer encryption scheme TLES to transmit secret keys between different proxies. The experiments results further show that the key sharing scheme indeed introduces fairly low overhead. Certainly, IDCrypt still faces some technical challenges, and further research and improvement are needed. For example, due to the wide variety of cloud applications, we need to automatically match more protocols and build the index for them to search.
APPENDIX
The security of OWE TLES scheme is based on the security of OWE PKE [19] and the security of OWE IBE [18] .
A. SECURITY OF OWE PKE
Let PE = (K , E , D) be a PKE scheme. Let A be a probabilistic polynomial-time adversary. Given a sufficiently large s, we say that PE is OWE secure if for every PPT adversary A, all polynomials p, the advantage of A is
In which MSP represents message spaces determined by s. The message x is picked up uniformly from MSP to compute a ciphertext y. Then the adversary A outputs a string on input (pk, y) as the decryption of y with pk.
B. SECURITY OF OWE IBE
An identity-based encryption scheme IE is ID-OWE secure if no PPT adversary A has a non-negligible advantage in the following game:
Setup: The challenger takes a security parameter s as input and runs the Setup algorithm. It gives the resulting system parameters params to the adversary, and keeps the masterkey private. Challenge: When Phase 1 is over, the adversary outputs a public key ID = ID 1 , . . . , ID m on which to be challenged. The challenger picks a random M ∈ MSP and encrypts it using ID as the public key. Then the resulting ciphertext C is sent to the adversary.
Phase 2: The adversary issues more extraction queries ID m+1 , . . . , ID n adaptively with the constraint that ID i = ID. The challenger responds as in Phase 1.
Finally, the adversary outputs a message M ∈ MSP. We say that IE is ID-OWE secure if for every PPT adversary A, all polynomials p and sufficiently large s, the advantage of A is
We are concerned about two different types of attacks referring to [17] : 1) by an uncertified client and 2) by the certifier, and we define two different games accordingly. In Game 1, the adversary has PKE public-private key pair and its IBE public key (including identity ID and possibly time parameter t), but does not know the IBE private key sk IBE corresponding to the public key params. It can make extraction and decryption queries. In Game 2, the adversary acts as the role of the certifier (PKG). It has the PKE public key PK , IBE public key params and its private key sk IBE , but does not have the PKE private key SK . It can make decryption queries. We say that our TLES scheme is OWE secure if no adversary can win either game.
Game 1: The challenger takes a security parameter s and runs the Setup algorithm of IBE. It gives the adversary the resulting system parameters params. It keeps the masterkey sk IBE to itself. Then the adversary interleaves extraction and decryption queries with a single challenge query. These queries are answered as follows.
-On extraction query <s, ID, PK , SK >, the challenger runs Extract algorithm to generate the private key d corresponding to the public key ID. It sends d to the adversary. -On decryption query <s, ID, PK , SK , C>. The challenger responds by running algorithm Extract to generate the private key d corresponding to ID. It then runs algorithm Decrypt to decrypt the ciphertext C using the private key d and SK . It sends the resulting plaintext to the adversary. -On challenge query <s , ID , PK , SK >, the challenger picks a random M ∈ MSP and runs Encrypt algorithm to encrypt it using ID and PK . Then the resulting ciphertext C is sent to the adversary. Finally, the adversary outputs a message M ∈ MSP. We say that the TLES is OWE secure against Game1 if for every PPT adversary A, all polynomials p and sufficiently large s, the advantage of A is
The challenger takes a security parameter s and runs the Setup algorithm of PKE. It gives the adversary the resulting PK . It keeps the SK to itself. Then the adversary interleaves decryption queries with a single challenge query. These queries are answered as follows.
-On decryption query <s, ID, params, sk IBE , C>, the challenger responds by running algorithm Extract to generate the private key d corresponding to ID. It than runs Decrypt algorithm to decrypt the ciphertext C using the private key SK and d. It sends the resulting plaintext to the adversary. -On challenge query <s , ID , params , sk IBE >, the challenger picks a random M ∈ MSP and runs Encrypt algorithm to encrypt it using ID and PK . Then the resulting ciphertext C is sent to the adversary. Finally, the adversary receives C and outputs a message M ∈ MSP. We say that the TLES is OWE secure against Game2 if for every PPT adversary A, all polynomials p and sufficiently large s, the advantage of A is
The proof for Game 1 adversaries is as follows. Let A be a PPT adversary that has non-negligible advantage (s) against TLES. Suppose A makes at most q E private key extraction queries and at most q D decryption queries. Then there is a PPT adversary B that has advantage at least (s) against OWE IBE. Its running time is O(time(A)).
We construct an adversary B that uses A to gain advantage (s) against OWE IBE. In Setup process the adversary B gives A the resulting system parameters params, and adversary B interacts with A as follows.
In Phase1 process, at any time adversary A issues extraction query <s, ID, PK , SK >, adversary B receives the query and sends them to the IBE challenger. The challenger runs algorithm Extract to get the private key d corresponding to VOLUME 6, 2018 the public key ID. It sends d to the adversary B, and then B sends it to A.
At any time adversary A issues decryption query <s, ID, PK , SK , C>, the adversary B decrypts the encrypted rP of C using the private key SK to get rP , then sends rP and the remaining data of C to the IBE challenger. The challenger responds by running algorithm Extract to generate the private key d corresponding to ID. It then decrypts the remaining data using the private key d. It sends the resulting plaintext to adversary B, and then B sends it to A.
Once the adversary A decides that Phase1 is over it outputs an identity ID on which it wishes to be challenged. The only constraint is that ID did not appear in any private key extraction queries and decryption queries in Phase1.
The adversary B receives the ID and sends it to the IBE challenger. The IBE challenger picks a random M ∈ MSP and encrypts M using ID . It sends C as the challenge to the adversary B, Then B encrypts rP of C using PK and sends it to A.
In Phase2 process, the adversary issues more queries where query q i is one of:
-extraction query in which ID = ID . The challenger responds as in Phase1. -decryption query in which ID = ID and C = C . The challenger responds as in Phase1. These queries may be asked adaptively as in Phase1. Finally, the adversary A outputs a guess M and wins the game if M = M . The adversary B outputs the same M and wins the game if A wins. So, if A is an adversary that has advantage (s) against TLES, then B is an adversary that has advantage (s) against OWE IBE.
In Game 2, let A be an adversary that has non-negligible advantage (s) against TLES. Suppose A makes at most q D decryption queries. Then there is an adversary B that has advantage at least (s) against OWE PKE. Its running time is O (time(A) ). The proof for Game2 adversaries is similar to the proof of Game1 and therefore omitted. This completes the proof of the security of OWE TLES scheme.
